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Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Gem County.
Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge presiding.

I
·

i
.

J

!

,
I

William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart
Morrow & Fischer, PLLC
332 N. Broadmore Way, Ste. 102
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone: (208) 475-2200
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Brody
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone: (208) 343-7510
Facsimile: (208) 342-2927

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett,ID 83617-0188
Telephone: (208) 365-4136
Facsimile: (208) 365-4196

Attorneys for Appe llant

Attorneys for Respondents

Attorneys for Respondents

'}

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1

II.

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 2

v.

A.

Drew Thomas Did Not Have an Express Employment Agreement
Separate and Apart From Ron Thomas' Promise to Transfer Thomas
Motors to Drew Thomas ..................................................................... 2

B.

Respondents' Reliance on the Written Management
Contract is Misplaced ......................................................................... 8

C.

The Fees Awarded by the District Court Must Be Reduced as the
Amount Awarded is Excessive and Unreasonable ..................................... ll

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
State Cases
Harbaugh v. Myron Harbaugh Motor, Inc., 100 Idaho 295 (1979) ............................... 4, 5

State Rules
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) .............................................................. .11,12

11

COMES NOW, Appellant Drew Thomas, by and through his undersigned counsel of
record, the law firm of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC, and hereby submits this Appellant's Reply
Brief on appeal.

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the Court is aware, this matter concems a lengthy and adversarial dispute between a
father who promised his son the family business, and a son who worked tirelessly in establishing
and managing the business as a result of such promise, only to get nothing. Plaintiff/Appellant
Drew Thomas ("Drew") left a promising career as a sales manager at a well established car
dealership to manage Thomas Motors, his father's car dealership, at a lesser salary. He did so
based on Defendant/Respondent Ron Thomas' ("Ron") promise that he would give Drew
Thomas Motors when he retired. However, after almost ten years of running Thomas Motors,
Ron sold Thomas Motors for nearly three million dollars, without including or even informing
Drew of the decision. Drew received nothing from the sale.
Drew filed the present action including claims for breach of contract and, in the
alternative, unjust enrichment.

Upon Defendants' initial filing of summary judgment, the

District Court upheld the breach of contract claim and dismissed the unjust enrichment claim
finding, "Plaintiff s assertion that he agreed to go to work for Thomas Motors at a reduced salary
in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer the business should stand or fall based upon
the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count 1.,,1 However, upon Defendants'
second motion for summary judgment, the District Court found the parties did not enter into a

I
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valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas Motors because: (I) a material term of the
alleged agreement was for Plaintiff to pay a monetary price for the business; and (2) the parties
never reached an agreement on the price or an objective means for determining the price. 2
As set forth in Appellant's initial brief and the below arguments, the District Court erred
in dismissing Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim only to later find an unenforceable contract.
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests this case be reversed and remanded back to the
District Court for further proceedings on Plaintiffs quasi-contract/unjust enrichment claim.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

DREW THOMAS DID NOT HAVE AN EXPRESS EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT SEPARATE AND APART FROM RON THOMAS' PROMISE TO
TRANSFER THOMAS MOTORS TO DREW THOMAS.

Defendants contend, "Plaintiff s argument for unjust enrichment fails to account for the
fact that there are two agreements at issue in this matter.',3 As demonstrated by Appellant's
initial brief, Drew fully acknowledges the District Court granted summary judgment on his
unjust enrichment claim based on a two contract analysis. 4 There is absolutely no question the
District Court found, despite the facts or pleadings in this matter, Drew had an express
employment agreement with Defendants separate and apart from Ron's promise to convey the
business. Therein lies the problem; the District Court's finding of two separate agreements is a
major issue driving this appeal. Despite the District Court's flawed analysis, this matter involves
one alleged agreement pursuant to which Drew agreed to leave his previous employment to

R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1085.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-24
4 Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-18.
2

3
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establish and manage Thomas Motors in exchange for Ron's promise to convey the business to
Drew upon Ron's retirement. s
Defendants attempt to liken the situation in this matter to that of a disgruntled employee
seeking "greater retroactive compensation for their employment on the basis that they worked
harder than other similar employees.,,6

Such analysis completely mischaracterizes Drew's

position. Drew is not looking for greater retroactive pay because he worked harder than other
employees. Drew is looking to be compensated for the benefit he bestowed on Defendants,
which was to create a viable business from the ground up which, based on Drew's dedication and
tenacity over 10 years of his life, Ron was able to sell for over three million dollars.
Defendants also repeatedly argue that in less than two years of being employed with
Thomas Motors, Drew was making as much as he had been making at Lanny Berg Chevrolet. 7
In making such argument, Defendants overlook a crucial point. Although Plaintiff s annual
salary was comparable to what he was making at previous jobs, the amount of hours and
responsibility at Thomas Motors far exceeded the hours and responsibility of Drew's previous
employment situations.
From the time Drew left his employment with Larmy Berg in September 1997 until late
summer 2000, Drew spent twelve to fourteen hours, six days a week working at Thomas
Motors. 8

Drew was responsible for getting the Johansen Motors premises converted and

equipped for a new car dealership and for ensuring Thomas Motors met and maintained
'R. Vol. I of6, p. 27.
Respondent's Brief, p. 35.
7 Respondent's Brief, pp. 29-30.
8 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 420, 429, 431,447.

6
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Chrysler's franchise requirements. 9 Drew not only handled all human resource matters, he
functioned as the general manager, the sales manager, the inventory manager, the finance
manager and the insurance manager. lO Drew also spent a number of hours each day dealing
directly with customers. 11 In most medium size auto dealerships, such as Thomas Motors,
separate full-time employees would have performed each of these management functions. I2
Clearly this was not a typical employee situation in which Drew worked hard and now
wants more compensation. This is a situation in which Drew dedicated ten years of his life to
Thomas Motors because he was promised someday the business would be his. Although the
District Court found the agreement failed because the material price term was never reached,

13

that does not negate the fact that Ron convinced Drew to leave a highly satisfactory position with
a stable employer to apply his knowledge and experience towards establishing and building
Thomas Motors, in order that Drew could someday inherit the business. I4 Drew spent ten years
of his career building a business with the expectation that he someday the business would be his.
Ron, on the other hand, stood by while Drew gave up his career at a stable company to build
Thomas Motors and then sold it right out from under him for a hefty profit, leaving Drew
without a job, without a business, and without anything to show for the last ten years of his
career.
Defendants also criticize Drew's use of Harbaugh v. Myron Harbaugh Motor. Inc., 100
R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 286-287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420-421.
R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420, 429-431, 443, 446
II R. Vol.3 of6, pp. 421, 430-431.
12 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 420-421.
13 R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1085.
14 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-284, 287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-457.

9
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Idaho 295,597 P.2d 18 (1979) in supporting his unjust enrichment argument. IS The fact that in
Harbaugh the plaintiffs were not suing for unjust enrichment does not change the similarities

existing with the present case. In Harbaugh, the plaintiffs left promising careers to manage their
father's business based on their father's promise that he would eventually transfer the business to
them. 16

Similar to this case, there was one alleged agreement which included salary plus

eventual transfer of the business. 17
The Harbaugh court properly examined whether there was a valid contract which
involved the sons leaving promising careers to take control of their father's business in exchange
for a salary and a promise from their father that the business would ultimately be transferred to
them. 18 The situations involved in Harbaugh and this case are identical in the sense that the
courts were called upon to determine whether there was one contract involving employment in
exchange for salary and eventual transfer of the business. However, instead of conducting a one
contract analysis similar to Harbaugh, the District Court in this case improperly determined that
because Drew received a salary for his employment at Thomas Motors, Ron's promise to convey
the business was part of a separate agreement. 19 The District Court's flawed analysis led to its
premature dismissal of Drew's unjust enrichment claim based on the following reasoning:
Since the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the parties had an express
employment agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff was paid a salary, including
one or more raises during his employment, the Court finds that it would be
improper to change the terms of that employment agreement by application of the
Respondent's Brief, p. 35.
Harbaugh, 100 Idaho at 298,597 P.2d at 21.
17 See ld.
18 See ld.
19R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754.
15

16
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doctrine of Quasi-contract. Plaintiffs assertion that he agreed to go to work for
Thomas Motors at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to
transfer the business should stand or fall based upon the jnry's determination of
his express contract claim in Count 1.20
Subsequent to the District Court's above decision, when the Court later found the alleged
agreement to transfer the business unenforceable, Drew's ability to rely on his equitable claim of
unjust enrichment was completely undermined.
Respondents further rely on numerous portions of Drew's deposition testimony in an
attempt to show that he had an express employment contract which was separate and apart from
Ron's promise to convey the business. 21 However, the following excerpts taken from the cited
testimony clearly demonstrate just the opposite, there was one breach of contract claim based on
one agreement providing if Drew came to work for Thomas Motors he would eventually get the
business:
Q.

Thank you.
What I'm hearing you say is your dad, you can specifically recall words to the
effect of, "Drew, if you come over, when I retire, the business will be yours,"
right?

A.

The dealership will be yours.

Q.

The dealership will be yours.
Is that pretty close to at least paraphrasing the words he used?

A.

That would be fairly accurate.

***
Q.

You're claiming here that your dad made an agreement with you before
you joined Thomas Motors that the dealership would be yours on his

20R. VoI.4of6,p. 754.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 24-28.

21
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retirement, right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

That's the substance of your allegation in this case; is that fair to say?

A.

That's fair.

***
Q.

Okay. And tell me about any discussions you had before the day you actually
joined about what salary you would make.

A.

He told me he would pay me $2,500 bucks a month.

Q.

When were those discussions, how close in time to when you actually started?

A.

Probably a month or so because I wouldn't have committed without knowing, a
month or so prior. He knew that it was less money at the time and that it would
be a lot of work. And it was, but that it would be worth it and it would payoff on
me.

***
Q.

What did you say in response to it? If it was less money than you were
historically making at the time at Lanny Berg -

A.

It was very much an issue for me, but that he guaranteed me it wouldn't last long.

Once we got the place going, that I would get an incremental raise. He
understood that I was not going to make as much as I had been, and that it would
be a lot of work, but that it would pay off.22
The above testimony unquestionably demonstrates Drew's agreement to leave his career
to go work for Thomas Motors at a reduced salary was based on Ron's promise that it would
eventually payoff, that Ron would eventually convey the business to him. Accordingly, when
such agreement was found to be unenforceable by the District Court, Drew should have had the

22

!d. citing R. Vol. II, pp. 283-284.
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opportunity to rely on his claim of unjust enrichment, and would have had such opportunity had
the Court not erred in prematurely dismissing such claim earlier in the lawsuit.
B.

RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE
CONTRACT IS MISPLACED.

ON

THE

WRITTEN

MANAGEMENT

Respondents discuss the written Management Contract signed by Drew in September
2000 at length in their briefing. 23 However, the Management Contract had absolutely no bearing

on the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Drew's breach of contract and unjust
enrichment claims. Accordingly, despite Defendants' spending significant time on such issue in
its brief, it is unclear how the Management Contract is relevant to this appeal. 24 Although the
written Management Contract has no bearing on this appeal, Plaintiff briefly addresses the issue
below to provide the Court with a clear understanding.
The Management Contract was a contract drafted in conjunction with two other
contracts, "Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business" and "Commercial Lease and Purchase
Agreement" in the summer/fall of 2000?S There is no dispute Drew wanted these agreements in
place to memorialize his and Ron's understanding that Drew would eventually receive the
business. 26 As specifically testified by Drew at his deposition:
Q.

Did you, in fact, repeatedly make requests of your dad after you joined
Thomas Motors to have your understanding in writing?

A.

I did - I would have liked that, yes. And I made that - he was aware of

Respondent's Brief, pp. 31-41.
The District Court's analysis regarding its dismissal of Plaintiff's Breach of Written Contract claim is contained in
the Court's Order on Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment of November 26,2007. R. Vol. 4 of 6, pp. 754756.
25 R. Vol. I of6, pp. 173-174; R. Vols. 1 and 2 of6, pp. 181-223.
26 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 290-292.
23

24
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that.
Q.

And-

A.

And the reason, if something happened to him - I told him if something
happened to you or mom or both of you, we need to have something in
writing, something to go by. And all I would get is it's handled. You're
worrying too much. It's your place. I don't want the place. It's your
place. I'm not doing this for me. I'm doing it for yoU. 27

***
Q.

What date was the management contract signed, Exhibit 47

A.

I honestly - I know it had to be on or around that first day of September,
but I cannot tell you exactly what day. But it was not the same time that I
signed these.
This got the ball rolling to keep me there. This got what Ron perceived to
be the ball rolling on how to transfer it to me, I suppose, is what he would
be looking at. 28

As demonstrated by the above testimony, Drew openly admits to signing the agreements
and actually requesting the agreements be drafted in order that he would have proof of the fact
that he was to eventually receive the business. However, there is a disputed issue of fact as to
when Ron and Elaine Thomas actually signed the agreements considering Drew never saw nor
received fully executed documents until this litigation was initiated. Although Respondents
contend Defendants signed and dated the agreements in September of 2000 and Drew's claim
otherwise is a "rather outlandish accusation," the fact is that this is a factual dispute that was
never resolved. As provided in the Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Opposition to Summary

Judgment:

27
28

R. Vol. 2 of6, p. 289.
R. Vol. 2 of 6, p. 292.
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As I testified in my June 26, 2007 deposition, when I signed the contracts, copies
of which are Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 of my deposition, on September 19, 2000, there
were no other signatures on any of the documents. Based upon my conversations
with Ron's attorney, the late Carl Harder, I expected copies of the contract to be
provided to me after they had been executed by my parents. I never received any
copies of executed contracts.z9
There is no question the three agreements were drafted in conjunction with one another to
reflect Ron and Drew's understanding that Drew would manage Thomas Motors and eventually
receive the business.

3D

Accordingly, Respondents' attempt to now separate the Management

Contract from the Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business and Commercial Lease and
Purchase Agreement, for purposes of this appeal is disingenuous. Respondents' contend, " ... the
existence of the Management Contract, executed by Plaintiff, makes it clear that Plaintiff s
employment was the subject of negotiation, that ultimately resulted in an express contract that
was reduced to writing. ,,31

Clearly this argument is meritless considering there were three

written contracts, all of which were executed by Drew and all of which were never followed by
the parties.
Not only does the issue of the Management Contract have nothing to do with the District
Court's findings being appealed herein, the contentions made by Respondents raise numerous
issues of fact that were never resolved.

Accordingly, Respondents' request that this Court

somehow look to the Management Contract to guide its decision on this appeal should be
summarily disregarded.

29
30

31

R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 424-425.
R. Vol. 1 of6, pp. 173-174; R. Vols. 1 and 2 0[6, pp. 181-223.
Respondent's Brief, p. 33.
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C.

THE FEES AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT MUST BE REDUCED AS
THE AMOUNT AWARDED IS EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.
Respondents contend Plaintiff does not appeal the District Court's award of attorney's

fees in this case but rather appeals the amount of fees awarded in requesting a reduction. 32 To
clarify Drew's position, if this case is reversed and remanded pursuant to this appeal, it goes
without saying that the entire fee award in this case must be reversed. However, if for some
reason this case is not reversed, Drew is requesting reduction of the amount of fees awarded
Defendants.
Respondents contend Plaintiff is urging this Court to "simply replace the District Court's
finding with its own determination of reasonableness.,,33 Clearly that is not the case. As set
forth in Appellant's initial brief, this Court is called upon to review the lower court's
determination of the amount of fees awarded for an abuse of discretion. The lower court's
discretion to award attorney fees is limited to awarding fees which are reasonable. Thus, this
Court must look to the reasonableness of the fees by assessing the lower court's consideration of
the specific factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3).
In this particular case, Drew is asking the Court to look at the $115,000 plus in attorney
fees awarded by the District Court, in conjunction with the fact that this case did not go to trial,
was resolved at summary judgment, and involved fairly straightforward issues. The $115,000
plus in attorney fees awarded by the District Court did not include any trial preparation or trial
time and from November 2007 forward the case involved only two claims, breach of contract

32
33

Respondent's Brief, p. 42.
Respondent's Brief, p. 45.
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and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Despite Respondents' contention, Drew is not claiming "the District Court is required to
"delineate its reasoning, within the four comers of its memorandum, with respect to teach
individual factor in Rule 54(e)(3).,,34

Drew is however claiming that the award must be

reasonable, regardless of how much detail the lower court provides regarding its analysis of the
Rule 54(e)(3) factors. As set forth in detail in Appellant's initial brief, attorney fees in excess of
$115,000 awarded in a case with straightforward claims (breach of contract and quasi-contract,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud) resolved at summary
judgment is excessive and must be examined carefully by this Court.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments in conjunction with those made in Appellant's initial
brief, Plaintiff/Appellant Drew Thomas respectfully requests this case be reversed and remanded
back to the District Court based on the following: (I) the District Court erred in dismissing
Plaintiff/Appellant's quasi-contract claim based on its finding an express employment agreement
separate from the agreement to convey the business; and (2) the District Court abused its
discretion in awarding excessive and unreasonable attorney fees in the full amount sought by
Defendants/Respondents.

34

ld. at pp. 44-45.
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DATED this 23rd day of April, 2010.

:~
William A. Morrow
Shelli D. Stewart
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on this 23rd day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 342-2927
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H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, ID 83617-0188

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196
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